University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 1 Volume 17 Issue 1 (Fall 2009)

Article 3

10-1-2009

The Resurgence Of Piracy: A Phenomenon Of Modern Times
Helmut Tuerk

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Helmut Tuerk, The Resurgence Of Piracy: A Phenomenon Of Modern Times, 17 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 1 (2009)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol17/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE RESURGENCE OF PIRACY:

A PHENOMENON OF

MODERN TIMES
Helmut Tuerk
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

Introduction .........................................
History of Piracy ..................................
Definition of Piracy ............................
Universal Jurisdiction ...........................
Repression of Piracy ...........................
Piracy and Terrorism ...........................
Current Problems .............................
Conclusion .........................................

3
6
10
15
19
26
32
41

SUMMARY

Maritime piracy has a very long history and was thought to have,
more or less, become a matter of the past. Its resurgence, which threatens
world trade and internationalsecurity, is a phenomenon of modern times.
This development is attributableto many factors,from the poverty of coastal
populations and desire for financial gain, to the weakness of some states'
policing functions, or even, as in the case of Somalia, the absence of an
effective government and economic collapse, to the deficiencies of the legal
environment characterizedby both an insufficient legal framework and the
lack of a response mechanism to counterpiraticalactivities.
Under customary international law, there is no authoritative
definition of piracy. Rather, the concept was first codified by the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and later by the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), although in a rather narrow
manner, to include only acts committed for "privateends" on the high seas,
and only those undertaken by one ship or aircraft against another ship or
aircraft. Unlawful acts of violence directed against a ship, or against
persons or property aboard,within a state's jurisdiction have been defined
The author is a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in
Hamburg and currently its Vice-President. For many years he has served as a
member of the Austrian delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea and has also represented his country at subsequent meetings and
negotiations in that field. Opinions expressed in this Article are personal and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Tribunal as a whole.
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by the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO) as "armed robbery," an
offense to which universal jurisdiction, which permits any state to capture
and punishpirates under its own municipallaw, is not applicable.As Article
100 UNCLOSprovides that "all States shall cooperate to the fullest possible
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, " the view seems justified that the
suppression ofpiracy, asidefrom being a right, is also an internationalduty.
While piracy and terrorism at sea have many similarities, and
though both are forms of violent interference with shipping, there is a
marked difference between the goals of pirates and terrorists, to wit: while
pirates usually seek financial gain, terrorists wish to make a "politicalor
ideological"point, most often coupled with the wanton destruction of human
life. Terrorism at sea was first dealt with by the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA), the scope of which was considerably expanded by an amending
Protocol in 2005.
The IMO has for years endeavoured to design practicalmeasures to
deal with piracy and armed robbery against ships, as well as to draft
relevant new internationallegal rules providing guidance to states and the
shipping community. The enactment offurther modern national anti-piracy
legislation is certainly requiredas applying to pirates the SUA Convention,
elaborated as an anti-terrorism instrument, seems to offer only a partial
remedy.
In view of the recent upsurge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the
UN Security Council, as well as individual states, have been taking more
robust action. The seizing states are, however, reluctant to prosecute and
submit to criminalproceedings in their courts the pirates and armed robbers
arrested in view of the attendant legal complexities, in particular, certain
human rights implications. The question is also currently under discussion
as to whether an internationalmechanism for the prosecution and punishment of suspectedpirates should be established. What should not happen, in
any case, is that pirates go free due to the lack of proper legislation or
political will.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The great oceans of the world - the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian
and Arctic - constitute a single interconnected expanse; one continuous body of salt water that is the defining geographic feature of
planet earth.1 The oceans and their marginal seas have long been an
indispensable arena for intercourse between human communities.
Before there was air traffic and instantaneous communication,
people, goods, and ideas travelled the world by ship. Today, even
with advances in technology, seaborne commerce remains the linchpin of global economy. According to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), "more than 90 percent of global trade is carried
by sea." 2 There are two particularly critical chokepoints for maritime
traffic: the Strait of Malacca, which is transited by around 50,000
vessels annually transporting about 50% of the total volume of oil
transported by sea; and the Gulf of Aden, with about 22,000 vessels
annually coming from or sailing to the Suez Canal, carrying more
3
than 120% of that volume.
Most of the oceans are under no state's jurisdiction, which
acts as both a barrier and a conduit for threats to the security of
people everywhere, 4 as piracy and armed robbery at sea have once
again become a prominent maritime threat. Pirate attacks generally
occur in four major geographical areas: the Gulf of Aden and off the
coast of Somalia; the Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the Niger
River Delta; the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia; and
the Indian subcontinent, particularly between India and Sri Lanka. 5
Since it began compiling relevant statistics in 1984, the IMO
has shown that the total number of acts of piracy and armed robbery
1 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 1

(Sept. 2005).

available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD 13 MaritimeSecurityStrategy.
pdf.
2 Richard N. Hass, Foreword to SCOTT G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT No. 46, THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA vii (May 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/

publications/attachments/LawoftheSea CSR46.pdf.
3 International Maritime Organization, Piracy in Waters Off the Coast of Somalia,
http://www.imo.org/TCD/mainframe.asp?topic id= 1178 (last visited May 11, 2009).
4 See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 1. at 1.
5

Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating maritime piracy.
html (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

v. 17

against ships so far reported to the Organization was 4978 by April
30, 2009.6 It is, however, also believed that, in general, incidents of
7
piracy and armed robbery at sea are considerably underreported.
The actual number of such incidents could thus be even higher. The
region off the coast of Somalia has now become the leading area
plagued by pirate attacks, some taking place over 500 nautical miles
off the coast. 8 The International Chamber of Shipping, on April 15,
2009, therefore recommended that ships should, unless unavoidable,
avoid planning a passage within 600 nautical miles of the Somali
coast in the Indian Ocean. 9
In 2008, maritime piracy reached its highest level since the
Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) of the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), a specialized division of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), began tracking piracy incidents in 1992.10 In that
year, global piracy increased by 11% and piracy in East Africa up a
stunning 200%,11 with more than 120 attacks of piracy and armed
robbery having taken place off the coast of Somalia. 12 For the first
three months of 2009, the PRC has already listed 102 incidents of
piracy and armed robbery, compared to 53 incidents in the first
quarter of 2008 - an increase that is entirely due to intensified Somali
6

See Int'l Mar. Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against

Ships. Issued Monthly
Acts Reported During April 2009,
2, U.N. Doc.
MSC.4/Circ.136 (May 5,2009), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData
Only.asp/data id%3D25553/136.pdf. Additionally. the number of acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships reported to the IMO in 2008 was 306, as opposed to 282
incidents of piracy in 2007. See IMO Mar. Safety Comm. [MSC], 86th Sess. (May
27-June 5, 2009), MSC Meeting Summary, available at http://www.imo.org/About/
mainframe.asp?topic id1 10&doc id=10620 (last visited June 30, 2009) [hereinafter MSC 8 6th Session].
7 See Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, Focus ON IMO (Int'l Mar. Org.), Jan. 2000,
at 2, available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D7985/
Piracy.2000.pdf.
8

IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia,
1-3, U.N. Doc. MSC.1 /Circ.1302 (Apr. 16, 2009) available at http://www.marad.

dot.gov/documents/MSC
1 Circ1302.pdf.
9

Id.

10Hanson, supra note 5; Niclas Dahlvang. Thieves, Robbers & Terrorists:Piracy in
the 21l Century. 4 REGENT J. INT'L L. 17, 26 (2006).
11See Hanson, supra note 5.
12 Pirate of Somalia. MAINBRACE, Jan. 2009 (No. 1), http://www.blankrome.com/
index.cfm?conentlD=37&itemlD

=

1816.
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pirate activity off the Gulf of Aden and the East-coast of Somalia. 13 In
fact, these two areas accounted for 61 pirate attacks, compared to 6
incidents for the same period in 2008.14 This surge in sea robbery is
unprecedented and perhaps the most significant eruption of such
criminal activity in 200 years, with the pirates making no discrimination among vessels. 15 Many pirates seek to justify their actions as a
response to illegal foreign fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in
Somali waters, 16 (i.e., the country's 200-nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone).
Today's pirates constitute a serious threat not only for those
at the front line (e.g., seafarers, fishermen and shipping companies),
but also for the international community at large because of the
repercussions they have on world trade and international security.
Modern day piracy has been estimated to cost between $13 and $16
billion every year, a figure that could be substantially higher in the
future. 17 This resurgence of piracy and armed robbery against ships is
attributable to many factors, including: the poverty of coastal populations and desire for financial gain; the weakness of some states'
policing functions, or even (as in the case of Somalia) the absence of
an effective government; economic collapse; and the deficiencies of
the legal environment, characterized by both an insufficient legal
13 International

Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services, PiracyAttacks

Almost Doubled in 2009 First Quarter. Apr. 21, 2009, available at http://www.icc-

ccs.org/index.php?option=com content&view=article&id=350:piracy-attacksalmost-doubled-in-2009-first-quarter&catid=60:news&Itemid= 51 (last visited June
5, 2009).
14 Id.

15 Eugene

Kontorovich, InternationalLegal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of

Somalia, 13

ASIL INSIGHTS

(No. 2) 1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.asil.org/

insights090206.cfm.

16 INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE SOMALI COAST, PIRACY OFF

THE SOMALI COAST: WORKSHOP COMMISSIONED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE

UN

TO SOMALIA

12 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at

http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia piracy intl experts report consolidated.
pdf, at 27 [hereinafter "Somali Coast Workshop"]; see also Nicole Stracke & Marie
Bos,

GULF RESEARCH CENTER, PIRACY: MOTIVATION AND TACTICS: THE CASE OF

PIRACY 45 (Feb. 2009), available at http://kmsl.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/
Files/ISN/97641/ipublicationdocument singledocument/FB07C80E-33FE-4BC589A2-80B9FC4406BD/en/2009-02 Piracy+Motivation+and+Tactics.pdf.
17 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partneringand the Lav, 40 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 43, 45 (2009).
SOMALI
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framework and the lack of a response mechanism to counter piratical
activities. 18
II.

HISTORY OF PIRACY

The concept of piracy has existed for thousands of years. 19
"Early historians have suggested that acts of piracy can be traced
back to the beginnings of navigation," when piracy was "regarded
20
only as one of the means of livelihood that the sea offered."
Homer's epic poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey, addressed the issue of
piracy as early as the seventh or eighth century B.C. 21 The most
famous victims of this practice were the Greek philosopher Plato and
22
the young Julius Caesar, both eventually freed against a ransom.
The concept of piracy has, however, undergone an important
evolution from that time until its codification in the twentieth
century. In antiquity, almost anyone who attacked another on the
open sea was referred to as a "pirate." 23 The fundamental Greek and
Roman conception of piracy distinguished between robbers, who
were criminals under domestic law, and communities called
"piratical." 24 These were political societies pursuing an economic and
political course which accepted the legitimacy of seizing the goods
and persons of strangers without the religious and formal ceremonies
considered a prerequisite for beginning a war. 25 It was believed that
"pirate communities" were in a "permanent state of war" with

18See Jose Luis Jesus, Protection of ForeignShips Against Piracy and Terrorism at
Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 INT'L J. MAR. & COASTAL L. 363, 365 (2003); Stracke &

Bos, supra note 16, at 16.
19Joshua Michael Goodwin, Universal Jurisdictionand the Pirate: Time for An Old
Couple to Part,39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 976 (2006).
20Id. at 977.

21 Jason Power, Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for National and
InternationalSecurity, 10 BARRY L. REV. 111, 112 (2008); see also John D. Peppetti,
Building the GlobalMaritime Security Network: A MultinationalLegal Structure to
Combat TransnationalThreats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 87 (2008).
22See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 17, at 44; see also Goodwin, supra note 19, at
978.
23See Goodwin, supra note 19, at 978.
24See id. at 978-79.
25

-
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everyone around them 26 except those with whom they had concluded
an alliance.
It was only in the late Middle Ages that the word "piratae"
began to be understood as "sea thieves" while the old Greek and
Roman usage of this term also seems to have survived in the Mediterranean Sea. 27 At about the same time, the legal status of war no
longer applied to many lawful private takings. 28 It was, in fact, in an
effort to avoid bringing about a state of war between princes that
"letters of marque and reprisal" were issued to private persons
authorizing them to recapture goods from foreigners that had been
wrongfully taken by those foreigners, not necessarily the original
29
goods, nor from the original taker, but from his fellow-citizens.
In the early seventeenth century, the Italian jurist Alberico
Gentili, who taught at the University of Oxford, argued that only
princes had the power to resort to war and that the label "pirate"
unmistakeably carried with it the connotation of outlawry, stating
30
that "pirates are enemies of all men [Piratae sunt hostes omnium]."
The laws of war could not apply to them and their actions were
forbidden by international law. 31 In his view, any taking of foreign
life or property at sea not authorized by a sovereign was synonymous with robbery on land. 32 This concept was based on the writings
of Cicero, who declared that "pirates were the common enemies of all
communities." 33 Cicero, however, used this phrase in a context
34
different from that of Gentili and others who emulated him,
namely, with respect to politically significant communities in the
Id at 979.
See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 19-20 (Transnat'l Publishers, 2nd ed.

26

27

2006).
28

See id at 31.

29 Id.

30 See
31 See

id. at 28-29.
id. at 29.

32 Id.

Goodwin, supra note 19, at 989. The source of the paraphrase "hostis humani
generis" has not been found, but has been attributed to Sir Edward Coke who used it
in a book published in 1644. Rubin, supra note 27, at 17 n. 61. By 1615 British
courts had determined "pirataest hostis humani generic." Michael Bahar, Attaining
33

Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy
Operations.40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11 (2007).
34 See Rubin, supra note 27, at 29.
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Eastern Mediterranean who pursued a course of behaviour similar to
35
that of the Vikings many centuries later.
The Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius, in his seminal work De Jure
Belli ac Pacis, published in its final version in 1646, defined the term
"pirate" quite differently from Gentili and asserted that the term
"piratical" should be applied to those who are banded together for
wrongdoing, but not to societies formed for other reasons, even if
also committing illegal acts. 36 According to Grotius, a gathering of
pirates and brigands was not a state; members of a state, even if at
times not free from crime, had been united for the enjoyment of
rights, and served to render justice to foreigners. 37 Thus, Grotius's
conception of the term "pirate" included robber bands on sea or land
but not the Barbary States or other communities engaged in piratical
activities whose primary purpose of association was considered
38
lawful.
The growth of modern international law in the postWestphalian order had to take account of the rapid increase of piracy,
which was most prevalent in the Mediterranean Sea and on the trade
routes between Europe and the Americas, reaching its heyday during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 39 While piracy was cracked
down on for disturbing "the commerce and friendship between
different nations," 40 privateering authorized by a sovereign was often
openly encouraged and became the preferred method of plunder on
the high seas. 41 However, with trade flourishing in the relative calm
after Napoleon's demise, nations began to increasingly view not only
piracy, but also the activities of privateers as detrimental to their
commercial and national interests. 42 Therefore, to counter a menace
that affected all nations indiscriminately and that could not be
controlled by the normal means of diplomacy or warfare, the
35See Goodwin, supra note 19, at 978.
36 See

Rubin, supra note 27, at 37.

37Id.
38 See

id at 39.

39 I.

Shearer, Piracy. MAX PLANCK

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.

http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-97801
99231690-el206&recno=2&author=Shearer%20%20lvan (last visited November 6.
2009).
40 See Goodwin, supra note 19, at 978.
41 Id.

42 See

at 981.

Bahar. supra note 33, at 12.
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"Declaration Respecting Maritime Law" was signed in Paris in 1856,
outlawing such state-sponsored piracy 43 in stating "privateering is,
44
and remains, abolished."
Piracy dwindled to a controllable and almost unnoticeable
level at the end of the nineteenth century only to make a strong
comeback, though in a different cast, in recent years. Indeed, at the
turn of the nineteenth century and for the greater part of the twent45
ieth, piracy seemed to have faded away into the mists of history.
Though a phenomenon as old as shipping and maritime trade, it was
thought to have forever been eradicated from most of the seven
seas. 46 The crime of piracy thus also began to disappear from some
criminal codes or was altogether not included in the first place. 47 In
the 1960s, however, piracy slowly started its resurgence and, by the
1980s, emerged once more as a regional, if not a global, menace.
South-east Asia was initially at the forefront of this new phenomenon, only recently to be replaced by the region off the coast of
48
Somalia as the "piracy hotspot of the world."
The notion of piracy was first codified by the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the High Seas 49 and later by the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 50 in Articles 100
through 107 and 110, which almost literally repeat Articles 14
through 22 of the 1958 Convention. These provisions are based on the
preparatory work of the International Law Commission (ILC), which
was greatly assisted by the research carried out at the Harvard Law

43 Bahar, supra note 33, at 12-13.
44 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, art. 1. Apr. 16, 1856, available at
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument.
45 Jesus, supra note 18, at 364.
46Id.

47 There are, for instance, no piracy offences in Somali law. Somali Coast Workshop,
supra note 16, at 11. Spain deleted the offence from its Criminal Code in 1995 and
France, as late as 2007. Paola Obelleiro, Juristasinternacionesdebaten en A Coruha
sobre lapirateria,EL PAIS, May 16, 2009 at 5.
48 Stefan EklSLf Pirates in Paradise:A Modern History of Southeast Asia's Maritime
Marauders,7 WMU J. OF MAR. AFF. 509, 509 (2008) (book review).
49 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
50 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1245 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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School, and which culminated in a draft Convention in 1932.51 Some
countries that are not yet parties to UNCLOS are nevertheless bound
by the 1958 Convention, which makes it so that the respective articles
52
state the international law on piracy currently in force.
III.

DEFINITION OF PIRACY

Under customary international law, there is no authoritative
definition of piracy, and the municipal law of a number of countries
is based on an extensive interpretation of that term, which has been
defined as broadly as "any armed violence at sea which is not a
lawful act of war." 53 Many countries criminalize "piracy" that takes
place in their own territorial waters which, however, is not piracy
under international law.54 Piracy was first authoritatively defined in
the aforementioned Convention on the High Seas and later in
UNCLOS, even though it was circumscribed by these legal instruments in a rather narrow manner. Article 15 of the 1958 Convention
and Article 101 of UNCLOS define piracy as:
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or
aircraft, or against persons or property on
board of such ship or aircraft;
(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;

51

See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly, 11

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 282, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/104/1956 [hereinafter Yearbook].
52 Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the
Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 399, 401 (2009).
53Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and
the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 273 (1988) (citation
omitted).
54 Michael H. Passman, ProtectionsAfforded to CapturedPirates Under the LfaV of
War and InternationalLaw, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 5 (2008).
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(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation
of a ship or of an aircraft with the knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) Any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an
55
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
When drafting this definition, the ILC considered certain
controversial points as to the essential features of piracy. In doing so,
it reached conclusions that the intention to rob (animusfurandi) is not
required; that acts of piracy may also be prompted by feelings of
hatred or revenge and not merely by the desire for gain; and that the
acts must be committed for private ends. 56 The Commission further
concluded that piracy can only be committed by private ships and
not by warships or other government ships, except when the crew
has mutinied and taken control of the ship. 57 It also deemed that
piracy can only be committed on the high seas or in a place outside
the territorial jurisdiction of any state - such as an island constituting
terra nullius - which is a rather remote possibility today. 58
The ILC also pointed out in the commentary that "[a]cts
committed on board a ship by the crew or passengers and directed
against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the ship,
cannot be regarded as acts of piracy." 59 The inclusion of aircraft
within the definition went beyond earlier customary law. 60 The scope
of this provision was further extended by the cited Conventions to
61
include acts of violence from an aircraft to ships on the high seas.
Geneva Convention on the High Seas. supra note 49, art. 15; UNCLOS, supra
note 50, art. 101.
56 An attempt at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to have
55

the words "for private ends" omitted "in order to include, within the definition...
acts of violence or depredation committed for professed political ends" failed. CTR.
3 UNITED NATIONS
199 (Satya N. Nandan et al.

FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW,
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY

eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) [hereinafter Virginia Commentary]; see also
Johanna Hjalmarsson. Piracy and InternationalLaw, SHIPPING & TRADE LAW, Dec.
2008, at 1.
57Yearbook, supra note 51, at 282.
58 Id.
59Id.
60 Shearer,

supra note 39, at 15.
supra note 51, at 282.

61 Yearbook,
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The Commission, however, dismissed the idea that the sinking of
merchant ships by submarines can be considered piratical acts - as
had been expressed in the 1937 Nyon Agreement 62 - because "to
assimilate unlawful acts committed by warships to acts of piracy
would be prejudicial to the interests of the international community." 63 It should also be pointed out that the meaning of the word

"illegal" in the definition of piracy is unclear and the legislative
history is not enlightening. It is thus for the courts of the prosecuting
state to decide whether the act of violence under consideration was
64
illegal under international law or the national law of that state.
The definition of piracy as codified on the basis of the draft
submitted by the ILC is thus quite limited, as it includes only acts
committed for "private ends" on the high seas and only undertaken
by one ship or aircraft against another ship. This excluded some
earlier conceptions of piracy that allowed for the crime to be
constituted by acts committed on board a vessel by passengers or
crew - so-called "internal seizures." 65 Such acts, even when consisting of holding the ship, its crew and the passengers for ransom as a

follow-up to the seizure, are thus not covered. 66 The same holds true
for violence in internal waters, the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters. Furthermore, "the private-ends" criterion removes attacks on
shipping "for the sole purpose of achieving some political end" from
the concept of piracy under current international law. 67 Acts of
violence and depredation exerted by environmentally-friendly
groups or persons in connection with their quest for enhanced
protection of the marine environment seem likewise to be excluded. 68
Additionally, in 1986, the Belgian Court of Cassation held that a
Greenpeace vessel had committed piracy against an allegedly-

supra note 39, at 2.
supra note 51, at 15.
Rildiger Wolfrum, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations Under

62 Shearer,

63 Yearbook,
64

InternationalLaw, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 8. 8 (Myron H.
Nordquist et al. eds., 2008); see also Virginia Commentary. supra note 56, at 201;
Akio Morita, Piracy Jure Gentium Revisited: For Japan's Future Contribution, 51
JAPANESE

65 Shearer,

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 76, 78 (2008).

supra note 39, at 15.
66 See Treves, supra note 52, at 402.
67 Jesus, supra note 18, at 379.
68
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polluting Dutch vessel when attacking it because the act of violence
69
was "in support of a personal point of view and not political."
It has also been stated that the definition of piracy under
UNCLOS might lead to a misunderstanding, as it refers to the high
seas without mentioning the exclusive economic zone created by Part
V of UNCLOS. 70 A proposal to expressly mention that zone in defining piracy was not accepted at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea. 71 This omission, however, does not mean that
piracy under international law cannot be committed within that area;
Article 58 (2) UNCLOS states that "[Alrticles 88 through 115 and
other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this part,"
which includes the articles relating to piracy. The exclusive economic
zone also encompasses the contiguous zone by reason of the definition of the spatial extent of that zone, as defined in Article 55
UNCLOS. 72 Piratical acts beyond the limits of the territorial sea are
thus treated as though they had been committed on the high seas.
The effectiveness of the rules on piracy enshrined in
UNCLOS has suffered from the fact that these are limited to the high
seas and the exclusive economic zone. Pirates are thus able to evade
pursuit by crossing into territorial waters, which constitutes a
genuine problem. 73 The geographical limitation regarding the applicability of the rules on piracy has, to a certain extent, been aggravated
by the fact that UNCLOS has granted the right to establish a
territorial sea of twelve nautical miles instead of the previouslyaccepted limit of three nautical miles. 74 In past years, most attacks
against ships, however, have taken place when transiting the territorial sea, when in port, or at anchor.75 The IMB has therefore, for

69Shearer, supra note 39, at

16 (citation omitted).
id. at 19.
71 See Virginia Commentary. supra note 56, at 199.
72See Shearer, supra note 39, at 19.
73Douglas Guilfoyle. Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and
IMO Regional CounterPiracyEfforts. 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.690, 694 (2008).
74Cf Rosemary Collins & Daud Hassan. Applications and Shortcomings of the Lmv
of the Sea in Combating Piracy: A South East Asian Perspective, 40 J. MAR. L. &
70 See

COM., 89, 97 (2009).
75See Robert C. Beckman, The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol:
Tools to Combat Piracy,Armed Robbery and Maritime Terrorism, in LLOYD'S MIU
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statistical purposes, adopted a broader definition than the one
retained by UNCLOS. Under the IMB definition, piracy and armed
robbery at sea are "act[s] of boarding or attempting to board any ship
with apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime with the
intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act." 76 This
definition covers all acts of armed robbery against ships perpetrated
in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, as well as attacks
77
against ships at anchor or berthed.
The IMO adopted the Code of Practice for the Investigation of
the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, which
defines "piracy" as "unlawful acts as set forth in [A]rticle 101
UNCLOS." 78 Armed robbery is defined as "any unlawful act of
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
other than an act of 'piracy,' directed against a ship or against
persons or property on board such a ship within a State's jurisdiction
over such offences." 79 This clear distinction between piracy and
"armed robbery against ships" also makes it evident that the special
jurisdictional rules on piracy - universal jurisdiction - are not applicable to the latter.
Nevertheless, it has been noted that:
[T]he IMO's definition of "armed robbery against
ships" is not without ambiguity. It is called "armed
robbery" even though it includes offences committed
without weapons. Also, the phrase "within a state's
188 (Rupert Herbert-Burns, et al. eds.,
CRC Press 2009) [hereinafter Tools to Combat Piracy].
76 Derek S. Johnson & Erika Pladdet, Maritime Piracy in Asia. 32 HAS NEWSL. 45
(2003), http://www.iias.nl/nl/32/IIAS NL32 45.pdf.
HANDBOOK OF MARITIME SECURITY 188,

77 See 2007 ICC INT'L MAR. BUREAU ANN. REP. PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
AGAINST SHIPS,

3. available at http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/ICC-IMB-PRC-

2007.pdf; see also John I.Winn & Kevin H. Govern, Maritime Pirates,Sea Robbers,
and Terrorists: New Approaches to Emerging Threats. 2 HOMELAND SEC. REV. 131.
137 (2008).
IMO, Code of Practicefor the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed

78

Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A.922(22) (November 29, 2001).
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D23528/
A922(22).pdf. The Maritime Safety Committee, in June 2009, agreed on amendments to the Code for consideration by the IMO Assembly later this year. MSC 86th
Session, supra note 6.
79
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jurisdiction over such offences" is not entirely clear. It
may be intended to be confined to ocean areas within
a state's territorial jurisdiction, such as ports,
territorial sea, and archipelagic waters. However, as
worded, it could include attacks on ships in internal
waters, such as lakes or rivers, as well as attacks on
ships on the high seas that do not fall within the
narrow definition of piracy. Also it does not appear to
include acts of robbery aboard ships that do not
include violence or detention. 80
IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Piracy is the oldest crime and one of only a few where
universal jurisdiction has been generally recognized under
customary international law independent upon specific requirements. 81 The right to take enforcement measures against pirates is
vested in all states; therefore, any of them has a right to capture and
punish pirates under its own municipal law, even when the accused
pirate is not a national of the state and the crime was neither
82
committed against its nationals nor within its territorial waters.
Universal jurisdiction over piracy was accepted because pirates
indiscriminately attacked all states' ships and constituted a threat to
everyone. 83 It was theoretically justified by applying to them the
concept of hostis humani generis - enemies of all mankind. 84 Furthermore, pirates were not subject to the authority of any state; no state
could therefore be held responsible under international law for their
acts. 85 The principle of universal jurisdiction is reflected in Article 105
UNCLOS, which provides that on the high seas, or in any place

80 Robert C. Beckman, Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in
Southeast Asia: The Way Forward,33 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L., 317, 319-20, (2002).
81Halberstam, supra note 53, at 272.
82 Id at 279.
83 Id at 288.
84Id; see also Jesus, supra note 18, at 384; Tina. Garmon, InternationalLaw of the
Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th,
27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 259 (2002).
85See Halberstam, supra note 53, at 288.
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outside the jurisdiction of any state, 86 "every state has the right to
seize the pirate ship, arrest the pirates, and seize the property on
board." 87 Such a provision functions "as an exception to the principle
governing jurisdiction on the high seas, which provides that ships on
the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag
state." 88
According to Article 107 UNCLOS, "a seizure on account of
piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on
government service and authorized to that effect." 89 The ILC has
pointed out with respect to this provision that it "does not apply in
the case of a merchant ship which has repulsed an attack by a pirate
ship and, in exercising its right of self-defense, overpowers the pirate
ship and subsequently hands it over to a warship or to the authorities
of a coastal state. 90 This would not be considered a "seizure" within
the meaning of that provision. 91
The respective Article does not authorize the "seizure of a
pirate ship or aircraft in territorial waters, archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State or internal waters, even for acts falling within the
92
definition of piracy that have been committed on the high seas."
Despite several states' support for a provision requiring "a State
encountering a pirate ship or aircraft in the exclusive economic zone
of another State to notify the coastal State and cooperate in taking
appropriate measures," the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea did not accept such recommendations. 93 If the seizure
of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been affected without
adequate grounds, "the state making the seizure is liable to the state

86

"In its commentary on article 39 of its 1956 draft articles, the International Law

Commission stated that piracy 'cannot be committed within the territory of a State or
in its territorial sea' as it is a "matter for the State affected to take the necessary
measures for the repression of the acts committed within its territory." Virginia
Commentary, supra note 56, at 201.
87 Tools to Combat Piracy. supra note 75, at 188.
88 Id.; see also Virginia Commentary, supra note 56, at 213.
89 UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 107.
90 Yearbook, supra note 51, at 283.
91 Id.
92 Virginia Commentary, supra note 56, at 215.
93Id. at 214.
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of nationality of the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by
94
the seizure."
The seizing state's courts may decide on the penalties to be
imposed and determine the action to be taken with regard to the
seized vessel and property, subject to the rights of third parties acting
in good faith. 95 The language of Article 105 may seem to indicate that
the exercise of jurisdiction by the seizing state's court is a possibility,
not an obligation, notwithstanding the "duty" to cooperate in the
repression of piracy laid down in Article 100. As the rule in Article
105 does not establish the exclusive jurisdiction of the seizing state's
courts, "[c]ourts of other states are not precluded from exercising
jurisdiction under conditions which they establish." 96 It has,
however, also been asserted that the drafting history of this provision
indicates that it was intended to preclude transfers of captured
pirates to third states. 97 In any case, while international law permits
action to be taken against pirates, it does not "ensur[e] that such
action is effectively taken." 98
The principle of universal criminal jurisdiction with respect to
piracy is also reflected in Article 110 (1) UNCLOS regarding the right
of visit of vessels on the high seas. 99 This provision generally "prohibits all acts of interference by warships regarding foreign ships on
the high seas save for certain exceptions, one of which is that 'the
ship is engaged in piracy."'1 00 The warship, military aircraft or other
duly authorized ship or aircraft may proceed to verify the ship's right
to fly its flag, and, if suspicion remains, continue with an examination
aboard the ship.1 01 If the suspicion proves to be unfounded, then the
ship is to be compensated for any loss or damage that it may have
sustained. 1°2 Furthermore, the right of "hot pursuit" may be exercised
against a pirate ship or aircraft. 103 An unjustified stop or arrest out-

94UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 106.
95See Shearer, supra note 39, at 18.
96

Treves, supra note 52, at 402.

97Kontorovich, supra note 15, at

Treves, supra note 52, at 402.
99Shearer, supra note 39, at 18.
98

13 (construing Yearbook, supra note 51, at 283).

100 Id.

101UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 110(2).
102 Id.at art. 110(3).
103Id.at art. 111(1).
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side the territorial sea is likewise subject to compensation for loss or
104
damage.
It has been stated that the labelling of pirates as "hostes
humani generis" is neither accurate nor can it provide a good reason to
apply universal jurisdiction to piracy. 10 5 A pirate need not be truly
the "enemy of all mankind" to be "found guilty of piracy and have
universal jurisdiction applied."10 6 Also, piracy is not seen as more
heinous than a number of other serious crimes. 10 7 Applying universal
jurisdiction to piracy has the potential to cause international tension,
as it might be used merely to harass political opponents or for aims
extraneous to criminal justice. Furthermore, the right of a pirate to
due process is violated, 10 8 particularly because he cannot know in
advance what acts will subject him to whose laws, 10 9 nor the possible
punishments for piracy, which range from three years in prison to life
imprisonment or even capital punishment. 110
Despite these arguments, which do not seem without some
merit regarding the right to due process, the principle of universal
jurisdiction continues to be upheld by the international community.
As a recent example, a U.S. Federal Court of Appeals held that a nonU.S. national who forcibly seized control of a non-U.S. vessel in international waters and who was later found in the United States could
be prosecuted in the United States.1 11 The court noted that universal
jurisdiction is based upon the notion that "offenses against all states
may be punished by any state where the offender is found [which]
allows a state to claim jurisdiction over such an offender even if the
offender's acts occurred outside its boundaries and even if the
offender has no connection to the state."1 12 The court further pointed
out that "due process does not require a nexus between such an
offender and the United States because the universal condemnation
104

Id. at art. 111(8).

105

Goodwin, supra note 19, at 994, 996.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995-96.

106
107

108Id. at 1004.
109

Id. at 1005.

110 Id. at 997, 998; see also Collins & Hassan, supra note 74, at 102; Dahlvang,
supra note 10, at 39, 40.
III United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 324 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008) (No. 08-5942).
112

Id. at 722-23.
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of the offender's conduct puts him on notice that his acts will be
1 13
prosecuted by any state where he is found."
V.

REPRESSION OF PIRACY

According to Article 100 UNCLOS, "[a]ll States shall
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on
the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State."1 14 Questions have arisen as to whether UNCLOS regulates the
seizure of pirates as a right or a duty and as to whether the parties to
UNCLOS are obligated to adopt and implement anti-piracy
legislation. The view seems justified that the suppression of piracy,
besides being a right, is also an international duty. 115 As the ILC
pointed out in its commentary:
Any State having an opportunity of taking measures
against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be
failing in a duty laid upon it by international law.
Obviously, the State must be allowed a certain
latitude as to the measures it should take to this end
116
in any individual case.
The question may further be asked: if states are obliged to establish
jurisdiction at least to detain an alleged offender in the case of crimes
117
against humanity, why not in cases of piracy?
According to Article 102 UNCLOS, piracy may not only be
committed by a private vessel or aircraft, but also by a government
113Id.

at 723 (citing United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F. 2d 1052, 1056 (3d

Cir. 1993)); see also Jorge Romero et al., The Pirates of Puntland Practical,Legal
and Policy Issues in the Fight Against Somali Piracy. NEWSSTAND: WHITE PAPERS
(K&L Gates LLP. Wash.. D.C.), March 2009, at 1. 5, available at http://www.
klgates.com/newsstand/search.aspx (search keywords "Pirates of Puntland")
[hereinafter Pirates of Puntland] ("Piracy is the oldest and one of the few crimes
where this legal principle of universal jurisdiction has been generally recognized
under customary international law.").
114UNCLOS, supra note 50, art. 100.
115 Augustin Blanco-Bazfin, War Against Piracy?: Some Misconceptions and
Oversights in the Repression of Crimes at Sea, IL DIRITTO MARITTIMO, Jan-Mar.
2009, at 266-67; see also Wolfrum. supra note 64, at 9.
116Yearbook, supra note 51. at 282.
117Blanco-Baz6n, supra note 115. at 266.
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ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied or taken
control of the ship or aircraft. 118 This provision is significant in that
such a seized vessel is no longer considered to be engaging in the
responsibility of the flag state and, therefore, may be apprehended at
will. 119 It would, however, be going too far to assimilate a government vessel to a pirate ship if the crew of the vessel has merely
disobeyed orders or resorted to criminality, as this would ordinarily
fall short of mutiny. 120 A ship is considered a pirate ship "if it is
intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of piracy"1 21 or has been used to commit such act, so long as
it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.
The problem of preventing and repressing piracy and armed
robbery against ships has been drawing increasing attention from the
international community, particularly since the early 1990s. The IMO
has played a leading role in providing guidance to states and the
shipping community with respect to this phenomenon. 122 In view of
the increasing number of pirate attacks, the IMO adopted Resolution
A.545(13) in 1983, which noted with great concern the increasing
number of incidents involving piracy and armed robbery against
ships and which recognized the grave danger to life and the grave
navigational and environmental risks to which such incidents can
give rise. 123 Governments concerned were urged to take as a matter of
highest priority "all measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts
of piracy and armed robbery from ships in or adjacent to their waters,
including the strengthening of security measures."1 24 They were also

118UNCLOS,
119Shearer,

supra note 50, art. 102.
supra note 39, at 17.

120 Id.

121See

Shearer, supra note 39, at 14(b).
Hayashi. Introductory Note to the Regional CooperationAgreement on

122Moritaka

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia. 44 I.L.M. 826, 826
(2005); see also Dahlvang, supra note 10, at 35.
123IMO, Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
IMO Assemb. Res. A.545(13) (Nov. 17, 1983). reaff'd IMO Assemb. Res.
A.783(18) (Nov. 4,1993), reaff'd IMO Assemb. Res. A.979(24) (Nov. 23, 2005).
reaff'd, IMO Assemb. Res. A.1002(25) (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://www.
imo.org/Home.asp?topic id=404 (follow "A.545(13)" hyperlink).
124Id.at 5, § 1.
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invited to provide the IMO with details of any measures they had
125
taken to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery.
In the following years, the IMO adopted further recommendations to governments regarding the prevention and suppression of
piracy and armed robbery against ships. It also dealt with measures
to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board
ships and further gave guidance to shipowners and ship operators,
shipmasters and crews. 126 The purpose of the aforementioned Code
of Practice for Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships was to:
[PIrovide IMO Member States with an aide-memoire
to facilitate the investigation of these crimes. The
Code, which is recommendatory in nature, was
adopted with full awareness of the fact that the fight
against piracy and armed robbery against ships is
often impeded in some countries by the absence of an
effective legislative framework to facilitate not only
the investigation of such crimes, but also the arrest
and punishment of those accused of such acts.
Consequently, one of the measures it recommends is
1 27
for States to fill this legislative gap."
In 2005, the IMO adopted Resolution A.979(24), 128 which
urged states to "adopt[] national legislation, as well as provid[e]
enforcement vessels and equipment and guard[] against fraudulent
ship registration." 129 States were specifically asked to take "legis121Id. at

5, § 3.
126 See IMO, Maritime Safety Committee, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships:
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators,Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing
and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. IMO Doc.
MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 (May 29, 2002), available at http://www.imo.org/Circulars/ma
inframe.asp?topic id=327&offset=462 (follow "MSC/Circ.623/REV.3" hyperlink).
127 Rosalie Balkin, The InternationalMaritime Organization and Maritime Security,
30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 11 (2006).
128

IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of

Somalia, IMO Assemb. Res. A.979(24) (Nov. 23, 2005), revoked, IMO Assemb.
Res. A.1002(25).

26, § 12 (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://www.imo.org/

Home.asp?topic id=404 (follow "A.979(24)" hyperlink).
121 Id. at 9, 24, § 7.4.
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lative, judicial and law enforcement action to receive and prosecute
or extradite pirates arrested by warships or other government vessels
and to continue consultations by which technical assistance can be
brought to regional states to enhance their capacity for repressing
piracy."1 30 Addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia,
in November 2007, the IMO adopted Resolution A.1002(25), 131 in
which it asked the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of that
country to:
[A]dvise the Security Council that it consents to
warships or military aircraft, or other [government
ships or aircraft], entering its territorial sea when
engaging in operations against pirates or suspected
pirates and armed robbers and of its readiness to
conclude any necessary agreements to enable
warships or military aircraft to escort ships employed
by the [World Food Programme] for the delivery of
132
humanitarian aid.

It seems obvious that "eradicating piracy calls for coordination among the international community and the close involvement
of regional actors."1 33 An excellent example is found in the Strait of
Malacca, one of "the world's vital maritime passages," 134 which, until
2005, was the main hotspot for piracy, and was even classified as a
"war zone" for purposes of indemnity coverage. 135 In 2000, the
130 Kraska & Wilson, supra note 17, at 50.
131 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of

Somalia, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1002(25) (Dec. 6, 2007), available at www.imo.org/
includes/blastData.asp/doc id=8754/1002.pdf.
132 IMO Press Briefing, High-level meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of Conduct to
Repress Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Jan. 30, 2009),

20,

http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic id=1773&doc id=10933
[hereinafter Code of Conduct].
133Commissioner Joe Borg, Address at the Seminar on Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Shipping: "Combating Piracy: Strength in Unity": To Prevent. Deter,
Protect and Fight Against an ACTUAL Threat 3 (Jan. 21, 2009) (transcript available
at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/events/doc/2009 01 21 piracy/dr borg
closing.pdf).
134 Id.

135Winn & Govern, supra note 77, at 133.
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Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships was held in Tokyo, in which sixteen countries from
South-East Asia and Hong Kong participated. 136 The Conference
adopted two documents. The first was the Asia Anti-Piracy
Challenges 2000, which was designed, inter alia, "to facilitate information exchange among coast guard agencies, as well as to cooperate
in enhancing law enforcement activities within each country, intercepting or seizing ships suspected of piratical acts and providing
immediate assistance to victimized ships and person."1 37 The second
document was the Model Action Plan, which "set[] forth a series of
specific actions to be taken by governments and the private
sectors."1 38 These specific actions also included the reinforcement of
139
self-protection measures by ships.
As a follow-up to these efforts, in November 2004, the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 140 was adopted with the
purpose to "strengthen regional cooperation and coordination of all
states affected within Asia to prevent and suppress effectively piracy
and armed robbery against ships."1 41 The central feature of the
agreement is the establishment of an information sharing centre in
Singapore, which also deals with information relating to individuals
and transnational organized criminal groups. 142 "The agreement
further envisages a system of cooperation among states parties in
detecting, arresting or seizing pirates and persons who have committed armed robbery, as well as in detecting the victim ships and
rescuing victimized persons."1 43 The narrow scope of customary and
codified law of the sea with respect to piracy is being expanded by
"including armed robbery in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters
and internal waters, and by including attacks directed 'against a
ship,' implying that they are not limited to those 'against another
136Hayashi. supra note 122,
137Id.

at 827.

138Id.
139Id.

140Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

Against Ships in Asia. Nov. 11, 2004, 44 I.L.M.829 (2005).
141
Hayashi. supra note 122, at 827.
142 Id.
143 Id. at

828.
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ship' as defined in UNCLOS Article 101."144 This agreement (which
entered into force September 4, 2006, and to which sixteen countries
are parties 145) is a model worth considering for other regions vulnerable to piracy. 146 For example, the Malacca Strait has seen a "notable
decline in attacks against shipping in recent years."1 47 Through collaborative efforts, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have
cut the number of pirate attacks by more than one-half since 2004.148
In the aforementioned Resolution A.1002(25), the IMO also
called upon regional states in East Africa to conclude an international
agreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy. The IMO further
developed such a draft regional agreement that may be applied to
any region, which presents an ideal model for states seeking to work
more closely together. 149 Draft provisions include "procedures for
states to conduct boarding and search of suspected vessels, and
provisions for criminal enforcement and determining choice of jurisdiction among coastal and flag states."15 0 As a result of these endeavours, a Code of Conduct to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
against ships was adopted in Djibouti on January 29, 2009.151 The
Code is open for signature by the twenty-one countries in the region
and has so far been signed by nine states. 152 The Code provides for
information sharing, interdicting ships suspected of engaging in acts
144

Id.

145 These

countries are: Bangladesh. Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India,

Indonesia, Japan. Korea. Laos. Malaysia, Myanmar. Philippines. Singapore, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbeiy Against Ships in Asia, art. 18, Nov. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/pdfs/kyotei s.pdf.
146 Borg, supra note 133. at 3.
147 Guilfoyle. supra note 73, at 691 n.2.

148 Fighting Piracy on Land and at Sea: Hearing Before the Foreign
Affairs
Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs, Human Rights and Oversight, 111 th Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of A. Costa), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/ 2009-1405.html.
149 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Recommendations to Governments for Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,
MSC/Circ. 622/Rev. 1. Annex, IMO Doc. MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 /Annex at 12 (June

16, 1999).

150 Kraska

& Wilson, supra note 17, at 54.
of Conduct, supra note 132, at 9.
152 These states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya. Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles,
Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. Id.
151 Code
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of piracy or armed robbery, and the apprehension and prosecution of
suspects. 153 It also offers "possibilities of shared operations, such as
nominating law enforcement or other authorized officials to embark
154
in the patrol ships or aircraft of another signatory."
In June 2009, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the
IMO agreed on updated Recommendations to Governments for
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships;
it also offered a guide to shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and
crew, including "a new annex aimed at seafarers, fishermen and
other mariners who may be kidnapped or held hostage for ransom,
based on the current United Nations guidance on 'surviving as a
hostage."' 1 55 Furthermore, "[a]n MSC Circular on Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia was agreed, to
include Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
and off the Coast of Somalia" as well as "additional guidance to vessels
engaged in fishing, indentified as being particularly vulnerable to
attack."1 56 The IMO Secretariat, at present,
intends to review existing national legislation to
prevent and punish the crimes of piracy and armed
robbery at sea as part of the Organization's antipiracy strategy, in response to UN Security Council
Resolution 1851 (2008) which notes with concern the
lack of capacity, domestic legislation, and clarity
about how to deal with pirates following their
capture. This problem has hindered more robust
international action being taken against pirates off the
153Id. at

4.
id at 5.
155MSC, Revised Guidance on Combating Piracy Agreed by IMO Maritime Safety
154See

Committee, MSC 86th Sess. (May 27 June 5, 2009), http://www.imo.org/About/
mainframe.asp?topic id=1773&doc id=11478.
156MSC 86th Session; The Secretariat, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.
Outcome of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, note to the

Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 86/INF. 13, (May 19, 2009), available at
www.sjofartsverket.se/pages/20646/86-INF13.pdf; see also Best Management
Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia,
(February 2009), available at http://www.marisec.org/piracy-gulf-of-aden-indianocean-industry-best-management-practice. These "Best Management Practices"
were supported by a large number of industry representatives.
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coast of Somalia and in some cases has led to pirates
157
being released without facing justice.
The United Nations General Assembly and the Security
Council have likewise repeatedly expressed concerns over the
increasing threat to shipping from piracy and armed robbery at sea.
The General Assembly, for instance, in Resolution 63/111, adopted in
2008, once again calls on states to cooperate in addressing threats to
maritime safety and security, including piracy, through bilateral and
multilateral instruments. 158 States are also being called upon to "take
appropriate steps to facilitate the apprehension and prosecution of
suspected pirates," which in many cases will require the "ratification
of the relevant international instruments[ and will] .. .also urge[]
States to adopt capacity-building and other measures and to work
with the [IMO] with a view to actively combating piracy."1 59
VI.

PIRACY AND TERRORISM

"While piracy and terrorism at sea have many similarities
and both are forms of violent interference with shipping, there is a
marked difference between the goals of pirates and terrorists: while
pirates usually seek financial gain, terrorists wish to make a 'political
or ideological' point, most often coupled with the wanton destruction
of human life." 160 Furthermore, "pirates act with stealth, while
157 International

Maritime Organization [IMO],. Legal Committee, Report of the

Legal Committee on the Work of its Ninety-Fifth Session.

9(c)(1), (30 March

3

April 2009), available at http://www.imo.orgNewsroom/mainframe.asp?topic id=
280&doc id= 11167.
158 G.A. Res. 63/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Feb. 12, 2009), available
at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4366312.html.
159
Borg, supra note 133, at 2.
160Helmut Tuerk. Combating Terrorism at Sea

The Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 337, 342-43 (2008); LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY 41
(M. Nordquist. R. Wolfrum, J.N. Moore, and R. Long eds.. Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2008) (2008); Leticia Diaz & Barry H. Dubner. On the Problem of
Utilizing Unilateral Action to Prevent Acts of Sea Piracy and Terrorism: A
ProtectiveApproach to the Evolution of InternationalLa, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.

& CoM. 1 (2004); Tammy Sittnick. State Responsibility and Maritime Terrorism in
the Strait of Malacca: PersuadingIndonesia and Malaysia to take Additional Steps
to Secure the Straight. 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 743, 751 (2005).
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terrorists seek publicity with their actions." 161 The view has also been
expressed that "[t]o expand piracy to include terrorist acts would
undermine the anti piracy regime, since the strategies to combat each
crime are poles apart. The offences should continue to be treated
separately .... "162 There is no authoritative definition of terrorism,
but all definitions have several elements in common:
First, there must be actual or threatened violence.
Second, a political motive is necessary. Finally, the
acts must be directed at and intended to influence a
targeted audience. The overall facet of these common
elements is arguably that an act is not terrorism
163
unless it possesses a deliberate political motive.
Terrorism was not officially condemned by the international
community as a whole until 1985 when the United Nations General
Assembly - in the wake of the hijacking of the Italian-flag cruise ship
Achille Lauro - by consensus, adopted Resolution 40/61 "unequivocally condemn[ing] as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of
terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those
which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security." 164 That hijacking led to a more profound examination of the
legal relationship between piracy and maritime terrorism. It soon
became clear that the "private-ends criterion" and the "two-vessel
requirement," as enshrined in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
and UNCLOS, made the rules of piracy inapplicable to the seizure of
that cruise ship and there was thus "an obvious legal lacuna which
had to be filled by creating a specific convention relating to maritime
terrorism."165
161Tuerk,
162See

supra note 160, at 343 (citation omitted).
Collins & Hassan, supra note 74, at 100. The U.S. "Annotated Supplement to

the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states that terrorist
attacks on shipping 'for the sole purpose of achieving some political end are
arguably not piracy under current international law."' Bahar, supra note 33, at 27
(citation omitted).
163Power, supra note 21. at 114, 115 (citations omitted).
164 G.A.

Res. 40/61,

15, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/61 (Dec. 9 1985), available at

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm; Power. supra note 21, at 115.
165Tuerk, supra note 160, at 343, 344; Jesus. supra note 18, at 388; see also Carlo
Tiribelli, Time to Update the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of
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As a consequence, the Convention for the Suppression of
166
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)
and a Protocol relating to Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf
were adopted by consensus in 1988 on the basis of a proposal
submitted by Austria, Italy and Egypt. 167 The SUA Convention which entered into force in 1992 and at present counts 154 state
parties 168 - is in substance based on previously existing anti-terror169
ism conventions by adapting their provisions to the maritime field.
"However, it is also a 'genuine' anti-terrorism convention because, in
the Preamble, there is an expression of deep concern about 'the
world-wide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms, the occurence of which is considered a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole."' 1 70 In drafting that Convention
however, no attempt was made to define the term terrorism, as to
have done so "would certainly have led to insurmountable political
171
difficulties."
"The SUA Convention is applicable to ships on an
international voyage operating or scheduled to operate seaward of
any State's territorial sea." 172 Despite the title of the Convention, its
operative provisions "deal primarily with events after illegal acts
have taken place; that is the apprehension, conviction and punishment of those who commit such acts, as opposed to the prevention or
suppression of those acts." 173 Only one provision - Article 13 directly addresses the problem of prevention or suppression. This
provision requires states party to cooperate in the prevention of the
offences set forth in the Convention "by taking all practical measures
to prevent preparations in their respective territories for [their]
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 8 OR. REV. INT'L L. 133.
144 (2006).
166Convention

for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation, March 10, 1988, No. 29004, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b3664.html [hereinafter SUA Convention].
167Tuerk, supra note 160, at 344.
168 SUA Convention, supra note 166; see also Summary of Status of Convention,
May 31, 2009, http://www.imo.org/TCD/mainframe.asp?topic id=247.
169Tuerk, supra note 160, at 343-44.
170 Id. at 347.
171 Id.
172 Id. at
173 Id. at

348.
348-49.
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commission within or outside their territories, as well as to exchange
information and to coordinate measures to prevent the commission
of those offences. " 174 Such offences include when a person unlawfully
and intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or (b)
performs an act of violence against a person on board
a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; . . . or (g) injures or kills any

person, in connection with the commission
175
attempted commission of any of these offences.

or

The core provision of the SUA Convention, enshrined in
176
Article 10, is the requirement for states "to extradite or prosecute."
There is, however, no absolute obligation to extradite as the
possibility of non-extradition for political offences, as well as the
right to grant asylum, are maintained. Nor is there an absolute duty

to punish because the state in whose territory the offender is found is
only required "to submit the case without delay to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution," which "shall take their
decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a
grave nature under the law of that State."1 77 This provision, although
corresponding to other anti-terrorism conventions, has been called a
deficiency of the SUA Convention since it may allow terrorists to
escape punishment. 178 "In support of the framework - dedere aut
iudicare - requires states to establish their jurisdiction over specified

174 Id
175
176

SUA Convention, supra note 166, art. 3.
Brad Kieserman, Preventing and Defeating Terrorism at Sea: Practical

Considerationsfor the Implementation of the Draft Protocolto the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlavful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA),
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA AND CHINA, 425, 425 (Myron

Nordquist. et al. eds., 2005).
177 UNCLOS,
178 Tullio

supra note 50, art. 10.
Treves, The Conventionfor the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the

Safety of MaritimeNavigation. 2 SING. J. INT'L
552 (1998) [hereinafter. Treves Convention].
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offences and make these punishable by appropriate penalties which
1 79
take into account their grave nature."
The events of September 11, 2001 have "exposed the
vulnerability of the global transport infrastructure both as a potential
target for terrorist activity and . . . a potential weapon of mass
destruction." 180 Therefore, wide-ranging new security measures for
international shipping were elaborated within the framework of
IMO, which entered into force on July 1, 2004.181 Furthermore, in
2005, amending Protocols to the SUA Convention and Protocol were
adopted, significantly expanding the scope of these instruments by
providing for an international treaty framework for combating and
prosecuting individuals who use a ship as a weapon or means of
committing a terrorist attack, or transport by ship terrorists or cargo
intended for use in connection with weapons of mass destruction
programs. 182 A mechanism was also devised for facilitating the
boarding in international waters of vessels suspected of engaging in
these activities. 183 Once these amendments are in force, "it will no
longer be possible for a State to refuse an extradition request or one
for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that the offense may be
characterized as politically inspired or motivated."1 84 The amendments, once again, provide no definition of terrorism, but instead
contain a terrorist-purposes provision: an act is thus criminalised
when its purpose, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act. 185
179Tuerk,

supra note 160, at 350.

180
Balkin, supra note 127, at 16.
181Tiribelli, supra note 165, at 147-48. "The most far-reaching of these new

measures is undoubtedly the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS)" which contains detailed mandatory security requirements for governments,
port authorities and shipping companies as well as a series of non-mandatory
guidelines regarding the implementation of these requirements. Balkin, supra note
127, at 17.
182
SUA Convention, supra note 166.
183U.S. Dep't of State Fact Sheet, Protocols to the United Nations Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/58322.htm.
184
Balkin, supra note 127, at 31.
185
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec.
19, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 38349 ("Any .. .act intended to cause death or serious
bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
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The SUA Convention drafters undoubtedly departed from
the premise that piracy was a crime already legislated in an
international treaty, namely UNCLOS. They certainly did not take
into account that so many states party to UNCLOS would see no
need to enact appropriate anti-piracy legislation in compliance with
that framework Convention. 186 In view of the lack of such legislation
in many countries, it has been suggested that the SUA Convention
could also be used to detain pirates, as the motive of the person
187
committing any of the offenses listed therein was not relevant.
At the SUA Convention, the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General had already pointed out that although the rules on
piracy were inapplicable to maritime terrorism, it would seem that
acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea could qualify as unlawful acts
under the Convention, as long as they met the definition of the
offences set forth therein. 188 In the same vein, the Security Council, in
Resolution 1846,189 for the first time established a link between the
SUA Convention and piracy by "creat[ing] criminal offenses to
establish jurisdiction and accept delivery of persons ... responsible
for

or suspected

of seizing a vessel or

.

. . unlawfully

and

intentionally seiz[ing] or exercis[ing] 'control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation."' 190 Furthermore,
states party to the Convention are urged to fully implement their
respective obligations and "cooperate with the Secretary-General and
the IMO to build judicial capacity for the successful prosecution of
persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of
Somalia."1 91
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population. or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.").
186See Blanco-Baz6n. supra note 115, at 265.
187See Tools to Combat Piracy. supra note 75, at 192; see
also Collins & Hassan,

supra note 74, at 106.
188 N.D. Korolyova, InternationalLegal Issues of Cooperation Between States in
Suppressing Piracy and Terrorism: Some Aspects, Moscow SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA 174, 177 (Thomas A. Clingan. Jr. & Anatoly L. Kolodkin eds.,
1991); see also Treves Convention, supra note 178, at 544; Virginia Commentary,
supra note 56, at 185.
189S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2,2008).
190Kraska & Wilson, supra note 17, at 56; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 189, at 15.
191S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 189, at 15.
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It has been stated that applying the SUA Convention to
piracy may help in some situations, but that this remained a defective
remedy because it did not reflect the clear distinctions between
piracy and maritime terrorism established by the drafters of the two
basic treaties addressing crimes at sea. 192 Although piracy legislation
in some states does not acknowledge these distinctions (as many
states party to UNCLOS have not yet updated their outdated nineteenth century provisions) it is clear from those that do that the use
of the SUA Convention for suppressing piracy does not reflect sound
legal policy. 193 It has thus been suggested that states ought to
modernize their piracy legislation in accordance with UNCLOS,
which should include "the obligation to exert jurisdiction not only in
connection with piracy incidents against the country's own ships, but
also in connection with ships flying the flag of other countries
affected by piracy."1 94 Once uniform piracy legislation is in place
worldwide, clear distinctions could be established between piracy as
a crime subject to universal jurisdiction on the one hand, and
unlawful acts under the SUA Convention on the other, to be counteracted not through universal, but through multiple jurisdiction. 195
VII.

CURRENT PROBLEMS

The steadily increasing danger for navigation in the Gulf of
Aden and off the coast of Somalia, as well as the outrage caused by
pirate attacks on ships carrying humanitarian supplies to the Somali
population, have been decisive in prompting the international
community into action in that region. In 2008, the United Nations
Security Council passed several resolutions dealing with Somali
piracy, each of which was "pursuant to Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, under which the Council may authorize the use of
military force against threats to international security." 196 These
resolutions aim at remedying the limitations of the rules of current
international law with respect to piracy - as far as their application to
the situation in Somalia is concerned1 97 - and also provide a legal
192Blanco-Baz6n,
193 See

supra note 115. at 265-66.

id.

194Id.
195 Id.

196See

Kontorovich, supra note 15, at 5.
supra note 52, at 402.

197Treves,
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basis for interception operations by the warships of a large number of
countries, including the United States, several European Union
Member States, China, India, Japan and Russia, patrolling the waters
of the Gulf of Aden and the coast of Somalia.
Since December 2008, the European Union has been
conducting a military operation, Operation Atalanta, in support of
the relevant Security Council Resolutions - the first EU maritime
operation conducted in accordance with the European Security and
Defence Policy. 198 The duration of this mission has been extended
until at least the end of 2010.199 NATO, after having instigated two
short-term missions against piracy off the Somali coast, on June 12,
2009, decided to launch operation Ocean Shield, which is anticipated
to run for an analogous period of time. 20 0 These international efforts
have been hampered by the fact that the naval forces have to answer
to individual national authorities with varied rules of engagement, as
20 1
well as by incompatible communications.
The Security Council in Resolution 1816, adopted on June 2,
2008, expressed its grave concern at "the threat that acts of piracy and
armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective
delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial
maritime routes and to international navigation." 202 It also determined that "the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in
the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of
Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the
region." 20 3 As aptly noted by one scholar, "[i]t is important to observe
that it is the situation in Somalia which constitutes the threat to inter-

198 Pirates

of Puntland, supra note 113, at 4; Council Joint Action 2208/749/CFSP,

2008 O.J. (L 252) 39; Council Joint Action 2008/851 /CFSP, 2008 O.J. (L 301) 34.
199Europa.eu, Council Extends Atalanta Operations, http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/
ukraine/press corner/all news/news/20090616 01 en.htm.
200 NATO Extends Anti-Piracy Mission, France 24, June 12, 2009, available at
http://www.france24.com/ (search "NATO Extends Anti-Piracy Mission"; then
follow "NATO Extends Anti-Piracy Mission" hyperlink under the results tab).
201 See Statement, Seoul High-Level Meeting on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(June

10, 2009), available at http://www.korea.net/News/news/newsView.asp?

serial no=20090622002 &part = 10 1&SearchDay = [hereinafter Statement].
202 S.C. Res. 1816,
2,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
203Id.at
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national peace and security, not the piracy and armed robbery as
204
such."
In the Gulf of Aden, where international shipping must pass
through a narrow corridor, pirates are able to launch attacks in international waters and then quickly return to Somali territorial waters.
The Security Council, with the express consent of the TFG of Somalia,
authorized states cooperating with that Government "in the fight
against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia" to
enter the territorial waters of Somalia for that purpose "in a manner
consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to
piracy under relevant international law" and to use, under the same
conditions, "all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed
robbery." 20 5 The authorization given by Resolution 1816, originally
limited to a period of six months, has been renewed for a period of
twelve more by Resolution 1846 of December 2, 2008.206
The basic effect of these provisions of Resolution 1816 is to
"make the rules of international law concerning piracy on the high
seas applicable also to territorial waters, inter alia, permitting pursuit
from the high seas into these waters," 207 and to "counter violence
against or aboard vessels occurring exclusively within Somalia's
territorial sea." 208 These provisions also clarify that states acting
under these rules within the territorial waters of Somalia may use
"Iall necessary means' - commonly associated with a general
authorization to use military force." 20 9 It has correctly been stated
that international law has "little to say about the manner in which
piracy may be suppressed." 210 Self-defence against armed attack or
threat thereof seems to be a guiding principle of states, the navies of
which are engaged in these anti-piracy efforts. Action against pirates
can be "assimilated to the exercise of the power to engage in police
action on the high seas" with respect to foreign vessels in accordance
with international legal rules.211 It would, however, seem that in any
204 See

Guilfoyle. supra note 73, at 695.

S.C. Res. 1816, supra 202, art. 7.
206 S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 189.
207 Treves, supra note 52, at 404.
208 Guilfoyle. supra note 73, at 695.
205

209

Id.

210 Id. (emphasis
211 Treves,

in the original).
supra note 52, at 413; see also Blanco-Baz6n, supra note 115, at 267.
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case the use of force must be necessary, proportionate and should be
preceded by warning shots where practicable. As the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has emphasized in a case before it,
"considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they
212
do in other areas of international law."
Furthermore, on December 16, 2008, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1851,213 extending the authorization of military
force to land-based operations on the mainland of Somalia, as that
Resolution authorizes nations for a one-year period to "undertake all
necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose
of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea." 214 The Resolution also invites "all States . . . fighting piracy off the coast of
Somalia to conclude special agreements . . . with countries willing to
take custody of pirates in order to embark law enforcement officials
('shipriders') from the latter countries, in particular countries from
the region, to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of piracy
suspects." 215 The exercise of third state jurisdiction by shipriders in
Somali territorial waters is, however, subject to the advance consent
of the TFG and such agreements or arrangements must not prejudice
the effective implementation of the SUA Convention. 216 Additionally,
"[w]here a shiprider arrangement is in place, transfers of suspects
from sea to shore is straightforward: they remain subject to the jurisdiction of the shiprider's government throughout." 217 Shipriders have
already been used to great effect against drug smugglers in the
218
Caribbean.
212 M/V

Saiga (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadinesv. Guinea), Judgment

of July 1, 1999, in International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Reports of
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. 1999, Vol. 3 (The Hague. Boston,
London: Kluwer Law International, 1999), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2
en.html (select "Judgment of 1 July 1999).
213 S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2009).
214 Id. at

art. 6.
art. 3.
216 See id.
215 Id. at

217 Somali
218 Costa,

Coast Workshop. supra note 16, § 2.3.
supra note 148, at 2. The Maritime Safety Committee agreed that the use

of unarmed security personnel is a matter for individual shipowners, companies, and
ship operators to decide. The carriage of armed security personnel, or the use of
military or law-enforcement officials (duly authorized by the Government of the flag
state to carry firearms for the security of the ship) should be subject to flag State
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Authorizing armed action against pirates in sovereign
territory is certainly an unprecedented measure by the Security
Council. "Because the Resolutions permit responses beyond those
permitted under customary international law they caused some
apprehension on the part of states with a history of piracy problems,
fearing the resolutions may set a precedent eroding national territorial sovereignty." 219 It has, however, rightly been pointed out that
there are important limitations to the authorization accorded by the
Security Council which make the relevant provisions less revolutionary than they might appear. First, as already mentioned, the authorization is limited ratione temporis.220 Second, its scope is clearly limited
ratione loci as the authorization provided "applies only with respect to
the situation in Somalia." 221 Third, cooperating states are requested to
ensure that anti-piracy activities they undertake "do not have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage
to the ships of any third State." 222 Fourth, it is affirmed that the
authorization provided "shall not affect the rights or obligations or
responsibilities of member states under international law, including
any rights or obligations" under UNCLOS, with respect to any other
situation. 223 It is also underscored in particular that the authorization
by the Security Council "shall not be considered as establishing
customary international law." 224 The point that the integrity of
UNCLOS must be maintained was made by several members of the
Council when Resolution 1816 was adopted and was likely a pre225
condition for its unanimous acceptance.

with shipowners, companies and ship operators. The Maritime Safety Committee
further expressed the view that flag States should strongly discourage the carrying
and use of firearms by seafarers for personal protection or for the protection of a
ship. Carriage of firearms may pose an even greater danger if the ship is carrying
flammable cargo or similar types of dangerous goods. See MSC 86th Session, supra
note 6.
219 See Kontorovich, supra note 15, at 7.
220 Treves, supra note 52, at 404-05 (quoting S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 202,
9;
S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 189, at 11).
Id.
Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 406.
221
222
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It must be emphasized that these Security Council
Resolutions were adopted on the basis of consent given by the TFG of
Somalia - pursuant to the aforementioned request by the IMO which sought and welcomed these measures because it lacks the
capacity to interdict pirates or patrol and secure its territorial
waters. 226 The reference to the consent by the coastal state concerned
greatly limits the "revolutionary content" of the resolutions, as the
activities authorized could also be conducted in the absence of any
Security Council Resolution on the basis of an agreement given by
the coastal state. 227 It is further to be noted that Resolution 1851
requires that any measure undertaken in Somali territory must be
consistent with applicable international humanitarian and human
rights law. 228 The latter condition may greatly limit the scope of
possible anti-piracy operations under the Resolution because, under
international humanitarian law, civilians may not be specifically
targeted except in immediate self-defence, 229 and pirates are, when
not combative, considered to be civilians. 230 United States military
officials have already warned that any action against pirates on land
would likely result in civilian deaths. "Still, Resolution 1851 clearly
broadens the scope of permissible 'hot pursuit,' allowing pirates to be
chased from the high seas into Somali waters and farther onto dry
land."

2 31

As previously pointed out, international law recognizes
universal jurisdiction in the case of piracy which, under the aforementioned Security Council Resolutions, also applies to seizures and
arrests in the territorial sea of Somalia. "The seizing states ... are,
however, reluctant to exercise such broad powers by prosecuting and
submitting to criminal proceedings in their courts the pirates and
armed robbers arrested" in light of legal complexities and, particularly, the human rights implications. 232 Thus, in a number of instances,
pirates have been let free or not been detained in the first place.
226See Kontorovich, supra note 15, at 7.
227 Id.
228S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 213, art. 6.
229 Treves,

supra note 52, at 412.
See id; Bahar. supra note 33, at 6.
231See Kontorovich, supra note 15, at
at 57.
232See Treves, supra note 52, at 408.
230
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Member States of the European Convention on Human Rights 233 are
obviously concerned that pirates might request asylum in the respective countries, as they certainly would claim to risk torture or the
death penalty if returned to Somalia.234 Furthermore, after pirates
had served a sentence and been granted asylum, they may also ask
for a family reunion; though no country would be eager to have to
import pirate clans. The question may further arise whether the
requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights of
bringing an arrested or detained person promptly before a judge can
be met in the case of a prolonged detention of a pirate suspect on a
235
naval vessel.
Ideally, suspects should be tried in the country where they
originated, but in the case of Somalia this does not - at least under
present circumstances - seem to be a realistic option. Flag states
could, of course, prosecute the pirates, but in many cases ships in the
region fly flags of convenience of far away countries. Another
commonly employed option is to conclude bilateral agreements with
a country in the region defining procedures for the detention, transfer
and prosecution of persons suspected of having committed acts of
piracy, as the United States and the European Union have done with
Kenya. 236 The latter agreement expressly provides that such transfer
233 See

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

Nov. 4, 1950, inter alia amended by Protocol No. 11. available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/O05.htm (last visited June 29,
2009) [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights].
234 Id. at art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."); see also The United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, art. 3(1) available at http://untreaty.un.org/english/treatyevent2OOl/pdf/
07e.pdf ("No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.").
235 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. supra note 233,
art. 5(3)
("Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions ... of this article
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release pending trial ....
; id at art. 6(1) ("In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law .... ").
236 See Costa, supra note 148, at 2.
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may only take place on condition of humane treatment and that no
one will be subjected to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.237 There is further a
guarantee that any transferred person will be brought promptly
before a judge and is entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release. 238 It remains to be seen whether the Kenyan justice system
will, in the long run, really be willing and able to cope with a major
influx of suspected pirates. That country certainly does not wish to
become a 'dumping ground' for piracy suspects from the entire
239
region.
The question is currently under discussion whether part of
the legal response of the international community to piracy should be
the establishment of an international piracy court or tribunal. Several
suggestions have been made in this respect, such as the creation of an
entirely new international tribunal on the basis of a Security Council
Resolution following the pattern of the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the establishment
of an African regional anti-piracy court in the same manner; the
creation of a hybrid tribunal following the model of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone; or amending the statutes of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the International Criminal Court in
240
the Hague by an international treaty.
As regards the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
it should be borne in mind that, at present, it could deal with piracy
issues only insofar far as they relate to disputes between states, or if a
legal question would be submitted to it on which it might render an
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having committed acts of piracy and detained by the European Union-led naval force
(EUNAVFOR),. and seized property in the possession of EUNAVFOR, from
EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such transfer, March 6, 2009,
Annex, provisions. 2009 O.J. (L 79) 51.
3(a) & 4.
238 Id. at
3(b) & (c).
239 See Treves, supra note 52, at 411.
240 See UN, Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: Working Group on
Legal Issues, Discussion Paper on Prosecution of Pirates: An International
Mechanism?. Copenhagen, March 3, 2009 (on file with author) at 2-3 [hereinafter
Contact Group].
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advisory opinion. 241 With respect to the International Criminal Court,
it has been pointed out that it has been established to prosecute
individuals for crimes of a much more serious nature than piracy, i.e.,
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression. 242 That Court would, therefore, not be suitable for dealing
with common criminals like pirates in cases where national tribunals
are unwilling or unable to prosecute them.
Amending the statutes of existing tribunals on a treaty basis
would undoubtedly require a number of years and thus would not
constitute a short or medium term remedy for the present situation in
Somalia. The question may be asked whether such an enlargement of
competence could also be effected by way of a Security Council
Resolution. The view has also been put forth that international
tribunals, besides being expensive to operate, are not at all appropriate for dealing with a crime like piracy - a common crime that has
existed for centuries - which is subject to universal jurisdiction and
243
has been successfully prosecuted in national courts.
In connection with the suggestion to establish an international tribunal, it must also be borne in mind that such tribunals
lack long-term prison facilities, and since states have little desire to
house convicted international criminals, they necessarily depend on
state cooperation for the enforcement of sentences. 244 They also must
find third states for the safe relocation of witnesses and acquitted
241
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persons. "In practice, this has been difficult, and relatively few states
have been willing to enter into sentence enforcement and relocation
agreements." 245 Posing a further challenge is the need for a residual
mechanism to carry out necessary functions after the tribunal has
completed its work, such as "protection of witnesses, monitoring of
sentence enforcement, review of acquittals, convictions and senten246
ces, ... [and the] preservation and maintenance of archives."
VIII. CONCLUSION
As pointed out, maritime piracy has a very long history and
was thought to have more or less become a matter of the past by the
time the modern law of the sea was codified in the twentieth century.
Its resurgence, which threatens world trade and international security, is a phenomenon of modern times that seems to have caught the
international community by surprise. The international commun-ity's
response to piracy and armed robbery at sea has therefore only
developed gradually and is still hampered by various factors, such
as: legislative gaps, as states have not performed their obligations
under UNCLOS with respect to the suppression of piracy; legal
complexities arising out of the need to harmonize measures against
piracy and armed robbery against ships with international humanitarian and human rights instruments; problems regarding coordination among the various naval units engaged in the fight against
piracy; and uncertainty regarding the extent to which warships can
enforce coercive measures in order to suppress a common crime like
247
piracy.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that the IMO has,
for years, endeavoured to design practical measures to deal with
piracy and armed robbery against ships as well as to draft relevant
new international legal rules. These efforts, together with those of
regional states, have already borne fruit in the Malacca Strait and
have recently been extended to East Africa, where they will hopefully
soon show positive results. Furthermore, both the Security Council
and individual states have been taking more robust action, and an
unprecedented armada is now patrolling some of the world's most
245
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strategically significant waterways. As regards piracy off the coast of
Somalia, it has rightly been emphasized that prevention is crucial:
"until there is law and order on land, there will be anarchy off the
coast."

248

The enactment of further modern national anti-piracy legislation is certainly required, as applying to pirates the SUA Convention (which was elaborated as an anti-terrorism instrument) seems to
offer only a partial remedy. The conclusion of a special anti-piracy
convention regulating the manner in which piracy may be suppressed and the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction
would certainly seem useful, although not an absolute necessity.
Despite some recent progress regarding the adoption and implementation of relevant national legislation, important challenges remain, in
particular, with regard to questions concerning the establishment and
exercise of jurisdiction, the fulfilment of evidentiary requirements,
and the attribution of law enforcement powers to military personnel.
It remains to be seen whether the international community
will eventually decide to establish an international mechanism for the
prosecution and punishment of suspected pirates. If there are impediments in this respect in national courts, those should be addressed as
a matter of urgency and not deferred in favour of attention to an
249
international tribunal that may not be available anytime soon.
What should not happen, in any case, is that pirates go free due to the
lack of proper legislation or political will, because "[n]o matter how
intimidating the presence of an international naval force may be,
pirates will not be deterred if they know that there is no law ready to
250
judge them."
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